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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OP 
THE STATE OP UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellees, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J. RITTER, 
Defendant and 
Appellant 
Case No. 93-0467 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
LARRY H. BROWN 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING. 
(Case Below NO. C-86-090-3354) 
Defendant/appellant, Larry H. Brown ("Brown") by and 
through counsel of record, submits the following Brief of 
Appellant: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as 
amended). However, the Utah Supreme Court has assigned this 
case to this Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4) (1953 as amended)• 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OP REVIEW 
I. Issues 
1. The trial court erred when it found a bailment 
between plaintiffs Douglas Allred and George Diumenti 
(collectively "Diumenti")1 and Brown where the court had 
already ruled that no contract existed between Diumenti and 
Brown and where there was no evidence to establish that any 
bailment agreement existed between Diumenti and Brown, or 
that any such agreement between the two should be implied. 
2. The trial court erred when it found that a supposed 
bailment between Diumenti and Brown included an agreement 
that Brown provide insurance for Diumenti's airplane where 
there was no evidence to establish that any bailment agree-
ment2 — much less an agreement concerning insurance — 
existed between Diumenti and Brown and where the law does 
not imply that Brown, as a bailee, insure the- airplane. 
1
 The second plaintiff, Douglas J. Allred was not 
involved in any of the dealings, meetings, transactions, 
etc. pertinent to this lawsuit. 
2
 Brown has marshalled all of the evidence presented 
which might support such a finding in the Appendix. 
2 
3. The trial court erred in awarding damages against 
Brown on the basis of a bailment between Diumenti and Brown 
where the court made no finding that Brown was negligent. 
4. Because there was no evidence that Brown was negli-
gent and ample evidence that Brown exercised the requisite 
care of Diumenti's airplane and because a finding of 
negligence is necessary before liability can be imposed, the 
trial court erred in holding Brown liable for damage to 
Diumenti7s airplane. 
II. Standard of Review 
To challenge the trial court's factual finding that a 
bailment existed between Diumenti and Brown, Brown must "(1) 
marshall all of the evidence that supports the finding, and 
(2) demonstrate that, despite the evidence, the finding is 
so lacking in support as to be *against the clear weight of 
evidence7 and thus, clearly erroneous." Edwards & Daniels 
v. Farmers' Properties, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah App. 
1993), P.2d , quoting, Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 
1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). 
However, this court should review the correctness of 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, this court 
3 
should not defer to the following erroneous legal conclusion 
made by the trial court: 
1. that a bailment agreement, which included an 
insurance provision, existed between the Diumenti and Brown 
since the trial court had already ruled that no contract 
existed between Diumenti and Brown; 
2. that Brown could be liable for damages on the 
airplane since the trial court made no finding that Brown 
was negligent in his operation of the airplane; and, 
3. that Brown could be liable for damages on the 
airplane since Brown established that he was not negligent 
and although Diumenti did not provide any evidence to show 
negligence, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
To resolve this case, this Court must interpret the 
common law of bailments. While bailment may be a straight 
forward notion, several issues complicate this case. 
As this Court has already noted, "[a] bailment is 
created when a party's personal property is delivered to 
another *in trust for a specific purpose, with an express or 
implied contract that the property will be returned or 
4 
accounted for when the specific purpose has been 
accomplished or when the bailor reclaims the property.'" 
Decision of Utah Court of Appeals in First Appeal, May 12, 
1992, ("Decision in First Appeal") at 2, fn. 1, exhibit "a" 
attached, quoting Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525, 528-
29 (Colo. 1982). 
On the basis of this analysis, this Court must decide 
whether, by piloting the airplane for Ritter, Brown became a 
bailee of the aircraft. This inquiry must consider, among 
other issues, that the trial court has already determined 
that no contract ever existed between Brown and Diumenti. 
Decision in First Appeal at 3. The trial court dismissed 
Diumenti's breach of contract claim against Brown on the 
basis that any agreement concerning the airplane was made 
between only Diumenti and Ritter. Primary Trial Transcript 
at 74. 
If, despite the trial court's dismissal, this Court 
does find that a bailment exists between Diumenti and Brown, 
this Court must then determine if, pursuant to this bail-
ment, Brown is liable for damages to the airplane. This 
Court has already held that negligence "is the basis for 
liability in a cause of action for bailment." Decision in 
First Appeal at 3, citing, Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 
5 
103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 at 685-86 (Utah 1943) (other 
citations omitted). Thus, this Court's determination 
concerning liability must reflect that the trial court made 
no finding that Brown was negligent in his operation of the 
airplane. Indeed, Brown provided sufficient evidence to 
prove that he exercised due care in his operation of 
airplane and Diumenti offered no evidence to counter this 
conclusion. 
Finally, because the trial court has refused to rule on 
Diumenti's negligence theory — and avoid a possible third 
appeal of this case — this Court should determine that the 
evidence at trial is sufficient to determine that Brown 
exercised due care in his operation of the airplane. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Dispositions Below 
Diumenti sued Brown and Ritter for damages caused to 
his airplane in a May 9, 1984 accident at the Tooele County 
Airport, asserting (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; 
and (3) bailment. Plaintiffs7 Complaint, exhibit "1" 
attached. The case was tried in April 1989 before the 
Honorable James Sawaya in the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County. During that trial, the court dismissed the 
6 
first cause of action — the breach of contract claim — 
against Brown. Primary Trial Transcript at 74. 
However, in a Memorandum Decision issued on June 14, 
1989, (exhibit "g" attached), and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered on July 18, 1989, (exhibit lfhlf 
attached), the court ruled that Ritter and Brown were 
jointly and severally liable for damages to the airplane 
because they failed to fulfill their contractual obligation 
to insure the airplane. The court made no ruling on 
Diumenti's bailment or negligence claims and awarded 
substantial monetary damages against Ritter and Brown. Id. 
Brown immediately appealed that decision. In an 
unpublished opinion dated May 12, 1992, this Court agreed 
that Brown could not be labile to Diumenti for breach of 
contract. Decision in First Appeal, exhibit "a" attached. 
This Court remanded the case to the trial court for 
reconsideration of Diumenti's bailment and negligence causes 
of action. Id. 
On June 8, 1993, oral arguments concerning this Court's 
decision were made to Judge Sawaya, now retired, but sitting 
by special assignment. The parties submitted written 
argument to the trial court, but presented no further 
evidence. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
7 
dated July, 1993 (exhibit "b" attached) and Order and 
Judgment dated September 7, 1993, (exhibit "c" attached), 
the trial court again awarded the same damages assessed 
against Brown after the 1989 trial, but now on a bailment 
theory. The court concluded that "under the bailment, there 
was an express agreement between the parties that defendants 
would obtain insurance to cover the airplane. . . . " Id. at 
3. 
Immediately after this second decision was handed down, 
Brown moved the trial court to make findings with regard to 
the negligence theory. Brown's Motion for New Trial & for 
Amended Findings & for More Findings, dated June 23, 1993, 
exhibit "e" attached. Although Brown has subsequently 
requested that the trial court rule upon that motion, the 
trial court has yet to do so. See, Notice to Submit for 
Decision, dated August 23, 1993; a duplicate copy of which 
was filed on or about November 4, 1993, exhibit "f" 
attached.3 
3
 In light of the trial court's declination to rule 
upon Brown's Motion for New Trial dated June 23, 1993, 
(exhibit "e" attached) and in light of the entry of the new 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (exhibit "b" 
attached) in July, 1993 and the entry of said new Order and 
Judgment, (exhibit "c" attached) on September 7, 1993, Brown 
must assume that the trial court has denied his motion for a 
new trial. 
8 
Brown is now appealing the trial court7s second ruling. 
His notice of appeal (exhibit "d" attached) dated September 
9, 1993 was timely filed, 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
At the time relevant to this proceeding, Brown was the 
manager of operations and chief pilot of a company, (Primary 
Trial Transcript at 5-6), for which co-defendant Ritter was 
the business manager. Id. at 77. The company, Mercury 
Aircourier Service ("Mercury"), provided passenger air 
service and transported cargo by airplane to various sites 
in Utah. Id. at 24. As business manager of Mercury, Ritter 
was responsible for all the routine business functions of 
the company including "contracting for aircraft" for the 
company to use. Id. at 77. Brown's duties, in contrast, 
centered upon flying the company's airplanes. Id, at 5-6. 
In April 1984, Ritter entered into negotiations to 
lease a Cessna 414 airplane belonging to Diumenti as part of 
Mercury's new business venture. Primary Trial Transcript at 
34; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at 
2, 5 2 (exhibit "h"). Ritter and Brown met with Diumenti at 
Ritter's home to discuss the general terms of a lease that 
9 
would be entered into by Mercury. Primary Trial Transcript 
at 34. 
The trial court determined, Ritter, not Brown, was 
responsible for the lease of the aircraft from its owners. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at 2, 51 
2 (exhibit "h" attached). When it dismissed Diumenti's 
first cause of action for breach of contract against Brown, 
the trial court also concluded that there was no evidence to 
establish that a contract of any sort existed between 
Diumenti and Brown concerning the airplane. Primary Trial 
Transcript at 73-72. 
Diumenti testified that, in all his discussions with 
Ritter, he understood that he was dealing with Ritter alone 
and that no third party was involved in the contract 
negotiations. Partial Trial Transcript (Diumenti) at 7, 9, 
10, 33, 42 & 43. Diumenti recalled that Brown was 
introduced to him as Ritter,s agent, as the person who would 
fly the aircraft if Ritter were to lease it from Diumenti. 
Id. at 8. Diumenti told the trial court specifically that 
the agreement concerning the airplane was made with Ritter, 
and "absolutely" not with Brown. Id. at 52. Ritter 
collaborated these statements, claiming that at no time 
during the discussion of securing insurance for the airplane 
10 
did Brown suggest that he would be responsible for obtaining 
the insurance. Primary Trial Transcript at 81. Brown also 
testified that he never intended to secure insurance for the 
plane and never told anyone else that he would. Id. at 53-
54. 
Unfortunately, before any written lease was signed 
between Ritter and Diumenti, while negotiations of the terms 
of the lease and inspection of the plane were both still in 
progress, the airplane sustained substantial damages 
($30,000.00+) in a landing at the Tooele County Airport. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at 5 6. 
At the time of the accident, Brown was flying the plane and 
Ritter was the only passenger. Primary Trial Transcript at 
22. Brown and Ritter were on their way to have the airplane 
weighed to comply with the rules of the Federal Aviation 
Administration. Id. at 30. Ritter instructed Brown to fly 
the aircraft to Tooele, Utah, to refuel it and to fly it to 
Logan, Utah for its weighing. Id. at 59. 
Before May 9th, the day of the accident, neither Ritter 
nor Brown had the keys to the airplane. Primary Trial 
Transcript at 148 & 208. During this time, the aircraft was 
sometimes parked on the ramp in front of Thompson Beechcraft 
11 
at the Salt Lake Airport and was sometimes gone from that 
location. Id. 
At the time of the accident, neither Brown nor Mercury 
was covered by Diumenti's property damage insurance on the 
plane. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1993) 
at f 10. There was no insurance coverage provided by 
Mercury or by the defendants to pay for the damage to the 
plane. Id. However, at the time of the accident, Brown 
thought that the airplane was insured — he never intended 
to fly the airplane uninsured. Id. at 222. 
At trial, there was no evidence that Brown was negli-
gent in his operation of the airplane or during the fateful 
landing, or that his conduct was the proximate cause of the 
accident. Indeed, Brown established his significant flying 
credentials and detailed the steps which he followed before 
attempting to land the airplane before the accident, demon-
strating that he exercised all due care in his operation of 
the airplane. In response, Diumenti was unable to provide 
any evidence which cast doubt on Brown's competency and 
reasonableness or to show that Brown's conduct was the cause 
of the accident. 
First, Brown established himself as a very experienced 
pilot. His career as a pilot began when he entered the Air 
12 
Force in 1954. Primary Trial Transcript at 6. By 1974, 
when Brown retired from the Air Force, he had already logged 
over four thousand (4,000) hours of flight time in the 
service of his country. Id. at 9. In 1964 Brown obtained a 
commercial license with instrument privileges as a result of 
his military experience. Id. at 7. While from 1974 to 1980 
Brown flew only recreationally, in 1980 he resumed flying 
regularly, this time as a commercial pilot for Air Express, 
Inc. Id. In this capacity, Brown flew a variety of air-
planes including Cessnas 210 and 172, (Id. at 10-12), double 
engine airplanes as well as those with retractable landing 
gear. Id. at 12 & 14. 
Before the accident, Brown flew Diumenti's airplane as 
a copilot and made three or four partial landings — or go-
arounds — during which the plane was not completely 
stopped, but was touched down on the runway. Id. at 60. 
These maneuvers required Brown to operate the landing gear 
three or four times. Id. Before the accident, Brown also 
took forty-five (45) minutes on one or two occasions to 
familiarize himself with the controls of the airplane. Id. 
at 18-19. 
At trial, Brown carefully explained the prelanding 
checklist that he used to prepare for landing the airplane 
13 
before the accident. Primary Trial Transcript at 210-212. 
Ritter, a licensed former Air Force pilot with twenty years 
of experience with the military, "challenged" Brown as to 
each item on the list and Brown would react appropriately. 
Id. In response to the challenge concerning the landing 
gear, Brown lowered the landing gear with the proper handle, 
saw the lowered nose gear in an exterior mirror designed for 
this purpose, felt the initial buffet that occurs when the 
gear is lowered and saw the indicator light that shows that 
the gear is lowered and locked. Id. at 211. 
Approximately three or four miles from the airport, 
Ritter reiterated the landing gear challenge and Brown again 
checked that the handle was in the down position, looked at 
the extended nose gear in the mirror and saw that the gear-
down light was on, before he responded to Ritter that the 
gear was down and locked. Id. at 212-213. This additional 
check of the landing gear was a common procedure for Air 
Force pilots. Id. From the time that the landing gear was 
lowered and locked, Brown and Ritter continued to feel a 
drag that occurs when the gear is locked into landing 
position. Id. 
Not until the propeller of the airplane contacted the 
runway, did Brown realize that the landing gear had mal-
14 
functioned. Id. at 214. Once aware of the problem, Brown 
attempted a "go-around" — a maneuver which would take the 
airplane back into full flight. Id. at 215. However, 
because the right engine of the plane failed to generate 
sufficient power, Brown was forced to abandon this effort. 
Id. After the crash, but before leaving the airplane, Brown 
checked and determined that the landing gear lever was in 
the down position. Id. at 216. 
The testimony of Ritter collaborates Brown's testimony 
that the landing gear was indeed down and locked when the 
airplane approached the runway and that Brown, as the pilot, 
followed all standard procedures to land the airplane 
properly. Id. at 95 & 97. Ritter also agreed that the 
right engine was quitting when Brown attempted to do a go-
around. Id. at 94-95. 
Paul Johnson, appearing for Brown, testified that once, 
in Diumenti's airplane, as pilot, he had experienced a 
problem with the landing gear, fid, at 18 5), and twice had 
the engines quit on him after he had landed the aircraft. 
Id. at 188. 
In response, Diumenti offered no evidence to counter 
Brown's demonstration that he exercised due care in his 
flying of the airplane. Diumenti presented no evidence that 
15 
Brown,s conduct was the proximate cause of the accident. 
For example, Donald L. Magnuson, the official from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (the "FAA") whose job it was 
to investigate this accident, testified that in his report 
concerning the accident, he expressed no opinion as to the 
cause of the accident. Primary Trial Transcript at 67. 
Although the landing gear was retracted when Magnuson 
inspected the airplane and he later tested the gear and 
found it apparently functioning, Magnuson made no assertions 
or even suggestions concerning the cause of the accident or 
whether the landing gear was functioning properly when the 
airplane landed. Id. at 62-72. Magnuson made no 
inspection of either of the engines of the airplane, (Id. at 
69-70), and did not test the landing gear with the weight of 
the airplane on it. Id. at 64-65. 
Ron Nelson, called by Diumenti as a "rebuttal" witness, 
did not see the airplane after the accident and also 
declined to speculate on the cause of the accident. Id, at 
239 & 243. 
Allen Woodhouse, also Diumenti's witness who helped 
repair the airplane after the accident, testified that 
according to his experience, there is no way to raise the 
landing gear except with the lever intended for that 
16 
function. Id. at 256. However, Woodhouse also declined to 
speculate on the cause of the accident. Id. at 247-2 56. 
Finally, the court remarked, at the close of Diumenti's 
case, that 
There's no testimony that they [Ritter and Brown] 
failed to do anything. The testimony as I under-
stand it and the state of the evidence is simply 
that the aircraft crashed because the landing gear 
was not in the down position — either was not in 
a down position or was in the down position and 
collapsed. 
Id. at 75. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court had no basis for finding Brown liable 
for the damage caused to the airplane during the ill-fated 
Tooele landing. 
First, the trial court erred in its determination that 
a bailment existed between Diumenti and Brown. Having 
already determined that Brown was not liable to Diumenti for 
breach of contract, the trial court could not properly hold 
Brown liable to Diumenti under a bailment theory. The same 
evidence — that Diumenti bargained exclusively with Ritter 
and believed he was dealing exclusively with Ritter — which 
proved that Diumenti and Ritter, not Brown, were parties to 
any contract concerning the airplane, also shows that Ritter 
17 
and Diumenti, not Brown, were parties to any bailment of the 
airplane. Furthermore, as an agent of a fully disclosed 
principal, Brown is not liable on a contract entered into by 
Ritter. 
Second, the trial court erred when, on the basis of an 
alleged express agreement, it insisted that Brown had a duty 
to obtain insurance for the airplane. Because the trial 
court had already determined that Brown was not a party to 
any contract concerning insurance, he could not be party to 
any bailment contract that included express terms concerning 
insurance. Furthermore, all parties agreed at trial that 
Brown never promised or suggested — never made any express 
statements — that he would take any steps toward securing 
insurance for the plane. As a result, any bailment which 
might involve Brown must be an implied bailment. However, 
the law has long concluded that under a implied bailment, 
the bailee is under no obligation to insure or act as 
insurer of the object of the bailment. 
Third, the trial court was mistaken when it found Brown 
liable for damages to the airplane under a supposed bailment 
contract. A finding of negligence is necessary before a 
bailee can be liable for damages under a bailment — the 
trial court made no such finding. Furthermore, Brown 
18 
established at trial that he exercised due care in his 
handling and operation of the aircraft. In turn, Diumenti 
offered no evidence to counter this showing. As a result, 
Brown cannot be liable for damages to the airplane under a 
bailment theory. 
Finally, this Court should dismiss, with prejudice, 
Diumenti's cause of action alleging Brown's negligence. At 
trial, Diumenti was completely unable to provide any 
evidence that Brown was negligent in his operation of the 
airplane. Brown has repeatedly asked the trial court to 
make a determination on this cause of action and he has been 
refused. In addition, this Court previously remanded 
Diumenti7s negligence claim to the trial court for deter-
mination, which it declined to do. To avoid subjecting 
Brown to the prospect of continued meritless litigation, 
this Court should rule on this issue by dismissing 
Diumenti's negligence claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. No Bailment Existed Between Diumenti and Brown. 
A. Because the Trial Court Already Determined that No 
Contract Existed Between Diumenti And Brown, there Can Be No 
Bailment Between the Two. 
A bailment is a contract. As this Court explained in 
its first decision in this case, the "^relation [between] 
bailor and bailee is created in contract.'" Decision in 
First Appeal at 2 (exhibit "a" attached), quoting, Potomac 
Ins. Co. v. Nickson. 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, 448 (Utah 
1924); also citing, Sumsion v. Streator-Smith. Inc.. 103 
Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 685 (1943) ("the entire duty of the 
bailee with respect to the bailed chattel is based on the 
bailment contract"). As a result, because there was no 
contract (either express, implied or constructed) between 
Diumenti and Brown, there can be no bailment. 
Bailment agreements are a subset of all contracts. The 
same elements and inquiries which govern the formation and 
sufficiency of a contract govern the formation and suffici-
ency of a bailment. Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 685; 8 Am.Jur.2d, 
Bailments § 54 (1980); 8 C.J.S., Bailments § 19 (1980). 
Because a cause of action based on the law of contracts is 
analogous to one founded on a bailment, the trial court's 
dismissal of Diumenti's contract claim against Brown 
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requires that the bailment claim against Brown also be 
dismissed.4 Where there is no contract, there can be no 
bailment. 
B. Tbere Is Insufficient Evidence To Establish a Bailment 
Between Diumenti and Brown. 
As explained above, the dismissal of Diumenti's 
contract claim against Brown dictates that Diumenti's 
bailment claim also be dismissed against Brown. Further-
more , the trial court's determination that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish a contract between 
Diumenti (leading to the dismissal of the contract claim) 
indicates that there was insufficient dealings between 
Diumenti and Brown for the purposes of creating a bailment 
agreement. 
4
 Although this Court, on the first appeal, closely 
identified a contract claim with a bailment claim, it did 
not specifically dismiss the bailment claim against Brown on 
the basis of the trial court's dismissal of the contract 
claim. Decision in First Appeal at 2. However, this court 
was never asked to do so. Id. at 1. Furthermore, while 
this court previously refused to equate Diumenti's bailment 
claim with his contract claim, it did so on the basis that 
the trial court made no finding concerning negligence — a 
requirement for attaching liability to a bailment. Id. at 
3. 
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The evidence presented at trial fails to establish that 
any agreement existed between Diumenti and Brown.5 For 
example, in all his discussions with Ritter, Diumenti 
understood that he was dealing with Ritter and that no one 
else was party to the negotiations concerning the airplane. 
Partial Trial Transcript (Diumenti) at 7, 9, 10, 33, 42 & 
43. Before negotiations concerning the airplane were begun, 
Brown was introduced to Diumenti as Ritter7s agent — the 
person who would fly the airplane — rather than as a party 
to any agreement concerning the aircraft. Id. at 8. 
Diumenti told the trial court specifically that the 
agreement concerning the airplane was made with Ritter, and 
"absolutely" not with Brown. Id. at 52. 
Diumenti also testified that Brown never promised or 
stated that he, Brown, would take any steps concerning 
insuring the airplane. Id. at 50-51. Instead, Brown's only 
role related to the agreement was that he would be the sole 
person who would fly the airplane. Id. Ritter7s testimony 
confirms Diumenti's understanding. Ritter stated that at no 
time during the discussion of securing insurance for the 
5
 Brown has marshalled all of the evidence that might 
support a finding of a bailment and agreement between 
Diumenti and Brown, attached hereto as an appendix. 
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airplane did Brown suggest that he would be responsible for 
obtaining the insurance. Primary Trial Transcript at 81. 
Given that neither Diumenti, Ritter nor Brown believed 
that Brown was a party to the airplane agreement, that 
Brown's role in the airplane agreement was that he would 
pilot the plane and that Brown never made any promises or 
other statements that he would take any steps concerning 
insurance for the plane, it is clear that there was no 
bailment between Diumenti and Brown. Instead, Ritter and 
Diumenti were the only parties to the lease agreement, and 
any bailment of the airplane was between Diumenti and 
Ritter. Because the contract was not with Brown, as 
Diumenti testified and the trial court concluded, then the 
any bailment cannot be with Brown. The law of contract and 
the law of bailment has never been that by acting only as 
the pilot of an airplane, an individual will somehow become 
party to any general agreement concerning that aircraft.6 
6
 The presence of Ritter in the plane at the time it 
crashed and was damaged is consistent with the theory that 
there was a contract or a bailment with Ritter, but not with 
Brown. Although Brown was piloting the plane at the time of 
the crash, Ritter was in possession of the plane and Brown 
only his pilot. 
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C As an Agent Of Ritter, Brown Is Not Party To and 
Therefore Mot Liable On Any Contract Entered Into By Ritter, 
a Fully Disclosed Principal. 
The fundamental tenets of agency law hold that the 
agent of a disclosed principal is not party to a contract 
entered into by her principal — even when the agent 
participates in the formation of the contract on behalf of 
the principal. Restatement (Second), Agency § 320. Because 
Brown was acting only as Ritter's agent or servant for the 
purposes of operating the airplane, he is not party to any 
agreement concerning the aircraft. Id. 
The evidence clearly established that Ritter was the 
sole defendant party to any agreement concerning the 
airplane. The trial court determined that Ritter, not 
Brown, leased the aircraft from Diumenti, (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at 2, 5 2) and that no 
contract existed between Diumenti and Brown concerning the 
airplane. Primary Trial Transcript at 74, Decision in First 
Appeal at 3. Diumenti specifically testified that he 
entered into a lease agreement concerning the airplane with 
Ritter, not Brown. Partial Trial Transcript at 52. Thus, 
Diumenti always knew that he was dealing with Ritter, not 
Brown, in entering an agreement concerning the plane. 
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These same findings and facts show that Brown's role in 
any agreement concerning the airplane was necessarily 
limited to acting as an agent or a servant of Ritter. Id. 
Brown was not a party to the agreement concerning the plane 
and no one thought that he was. Id. Instead, Brown was 
introduced as and understood to be Ritter's agent — the 
pilot of the plane Ritter intended to lease. Partial Trial 
Transcript at 8 & 51-52. Brown never made any promises to 
anyone suggesting that he would obtain insurance for the 
airplane. Id. 
Given Brown's role as pilot, rather than as a party to 
the airplane agreement, agency law requires that Ritter be 
solely liable for any contract or bailment which involved 
the airplane. Brown, as Ritter's agent or servant, is not 
liable for an agreement (either express, implied or 
constructed) between Diumenti and Ritter.7 Restatement 
(Second) Agency, § 320. Again, the law does not hold Brown 
to be party to an agreement concerning the airplane solely 
on the basis that Brown was to be the pilot of the plane. 
7
 An agent or a servant is liable for her or his 
tortious conduct. Restatement (Second) Agency § 350. 
However, to make a successful tort claim, Diumenti must show 
that Brown acted unreasonably, failed to exercise due care 
and that Brown's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
damage to the airplane. Diumenti has not done this. See, 
infra, at Points III & IV. 
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II. Assuming that a Bailment Existed Between Diumenti and 
Brown, the Terms Of this Agreement Are Implied and Therefore 
Do Not Include Any Provisions Concerning Insurance. 
A. Because the Trial Court Already Determined that No 
Contract Existed Between Diumenti and Brown, the Terms Of 
Any Supposed Bailment Between the Two Must Be Implied. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that "under the 
bailment, there was an express agreement between the parties 
that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the airplane 
during the time the airplane was in the defendants [sic] 
possession," Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 
1993), f 8 (emphasis added); see, Appendix for marshalled 
facts. In light of its previous determination that there 
was no agreement between Diumenti and Brown and its 
dismissal of Diumenti's breach of contract claim against 
Brown, (Primary Trial Transcript at 74, Decision in First 
Appeal at 3), the trial court cannot rule that Brown was a 
party to any expressed agreement with Diumenti. 
While the trial court had decided that "the oral 
agreement between the parties was that defendants agreed 
either to take steps to be added to plaintiff's insurance, 
or to obtain their own insurance policy," (Memorandum 
Decision (June, 1989) , 5 2 (exhibit "g" attached), it also 
specifically rejected the possibility that a such an 
agreement concerning insurance existed between Diumenti and 
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Brown. Primary Trial Transcript at 73-74; Decision in First 
Appeal at 3. Brown was not a party to the express agreement 
concerning insurance. Id. Brown never personally and 
expressly agreed to secure insurance. Therefore, any 
bailment to which Brown is a party cannot contain an 
"express agreement" concerning insurance — he made no such 
agreement. 
In addition, the same evidence discussed above which 
established, (1) that Ritter, not Brown was the sole 
defendant party to the airplane agreement; (2) that Brown 
never made any promises or suggestions that he would secure 
insurance for his operation of the aircraft; and (3) that 
Brown's role in the airplane agreement was limited to that 
of Ritter's agent, to pilot the leased aircraft, also proves 
that there was no express agreement between Diumenti and 
Brown concerning insurance for the aircraft. Because Brown 
was an agent or servant of Ritter, a fully disclosed 
principal, the tenets of agency law specifically require 
that Brown not be held liable on an express agreement which 
was made between and on behalf of Diumenti and Ritter. 
Thus, on the basis of the evidence, the trial court's 
prior dismissal of the contract claim against Brown and 
agency law, there could not be an express agreement between 
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Diumenti and Brown concerning the insurance for the 
airplane.8 This is particularly true because testimony from 
Diumenti, Ritter and Brown confirms that Brown never said 
that he would he would do anything to insure the airplane. 
Partial Trial Transcript (Diumenti) at 50-51; Primary Trial 
Transcript at 55 & 81. As a result/ any express insurance 
agreement necessarily was between Diumenti and Ritter alone. 
B. Even If A Bailment Existed Between Diumenti And Brown, 
the Law of Bailments Would Not Require Brown To Insure The 
Airplane. 
When the terms of a bailment agreement are not express, 
but only implied, the courts do not impose a duty on the 
bailee to insure the bailed chattel. Although required to 
exercise due care toward the bailed property, the bailee has 
no duty to insure the property. As the Utah Supreme Court 
explained: 
Since there was no express contract in this case, 
the rights and duties of the parties are con-
trolled by the contract which is implied by law 
from their conduct. . . . [T]he liability of the 
bailee is founded on negligence for the law will 
not now imply an undertaking on the part of the 
bailee to insure the safekeeping of the chattels 
bailed. 
8
 Brown has marshalled all of the evidence on the 
record that might support finding an express agreement 
between Diumenti and Brown. The inventory of the evidence 
is attached to this memorandum as an Appendix. 
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Sumsion. 132 P.2d at 685 (citations omitted, emphasis 
added); 8 Am. Jur.2d, Bailments § 136; 8 C.J.S., Bailments § 
47. 
Indeed, this Court has already noted, that in this 
case, a finding that a bailee was negligence would be 
necessary before the bailee could be liable for damage to 
the bailed chattel — again showing that the bailee is under 
obligation to insure the property. Decision in First Appeal 
at 3, citing Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 685-86; Barlow Upholstery 
& Furniture v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975). 
Given that Brown was not party to any express agreement 
concerning insurance on the airplane and that the courts 
will not obligate a bailee to insure the bailed property, 
Brown had no duty to insure the airplane. Similarly, the 
evidence in this case and the prior ruling in the trial 
court require that if a bailment exists in this case, it can 
be only an implied bailment. Because the courts will not 
require the bailee to insure the bailed property absent an 
express agreement, Brown owed no duty to Diumenti to insure 
his airplane. The Utah Supreme Court's further analysis in 
Sumsion confirms this conclusion: "[T]he plaintiff's 
evidence failed to prove an express insurer's contract, and 
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as we have seen from the above authorities the law will not 
imply one." Sumsion. 132 P.2d at 686. 
III. Assuming that a Bailment Existed Between Diumenti and 
Brown, Brown is Not Liable for Damages to the Airplane 
Pursuant to this Agreement Because He Was Not Negligent in 
His Operation of the Aircraft. 
A. Before A Bailee Is Liable For Damages To the Bailed 
Object, there Must Be a Finding Of Negligence and Proximate 
Cause. 
As this Court already noted in its previous decision in 
this case, "negligence . . . is the basis for liability in a 
cause of action for bailment." Decision in First Appeal at 
3, citing Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 685-86; Barlow Upholstery, 
533 P.2d at 901 (a "bailee has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care and caution commensurate with acceptance of the respon-
sibility of safekeeping the property of others entrusted to 
him"). Because negligence is an essential part of a plain-
tiff's case, she "has the ultimate burden of proof on this 
issue." Sumsion 132 P.2d at 686. If a plaintiff can show 
that a bailment exists and show that the bailed goods were 
returned in a damaged condition, he has made a prima facie 
case for negligence. Id. Further, when a prima facie case 
is made and when the bailee had exclusive possession of the 
bailed property, the defendant must establish that she 
exercised due care in her handling of the bailed property to 
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avoid liability. Id. This presumption rests on the 
practical consideration that when the bailee is in exclusive 
possession of the property, he has a better opportunity to 
establish the cause of the damage. Id. at 687. 
However, "the cases almost universally hold that this 
inference of negligence will not arise in those cases where 
the bailor . . . had the same opportunity to ascertain the 
facts as the bailee." Id. In any case, the ultimate burden 
of establishing negligence rests on the plaintiff. Romey v. 
Covey Garage, 111 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1941) ("If considering 
the evidence on both sides the jury is not persuaded that 
negligence by bailee either did or did not exist, then it 
must find for bailee (defendant), because on bailor (plain-
tiff) rests the burden of proving negligence"). 
A plaintiff cannot rest on a prima facie case of negl-
igence if the defendant presents evidence that she was not 
negligent. Staheli v. Farmers' Co-Op of Southern Utah, 655 
P.2d 680, 683 fn. 1 (Utah 1982) ("[i]f the bailee proves due 
care, and the bailor relies on nothing more than the pre-
sumption, a directed verdict in bailee,s favor would be 
appropriate"). In such a situation, a plaintiff still bears 
the burden of proving that the defendant (bailee) was 
negligent. Id. 
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In addition, there must be a finding that the bailee's 
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the 
bailed chattel• For example, in Sumsion, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that because there was no evidence that the 
bailee's negligence was the proximate cause of a subsequent 
automobile accident, the bailee was not liable for the 
damages which occurred to the bailors' car. Sumsion, 132 
P.2d at 687. The Court arrived at this conclusion despite 
evidence that the driver of tow truck failed to signal 
before entering on to an icy road. Id. at 682. Although a 
coal truck hit plaintiffs' car almost immediately after the 
tow truck driver pulled away from the curb towing plain-
tiffs' car, the court found that no link had been 
established between the failure to signal and the subsequent 
accident. Id.; see also, Staheli, 655 P.2d 680, 684 
("[w]hen the proximate cause of an injury is left to 
speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law"); Carey v. 
Waliner, 744 P.2d 881 (Mont. 1987) (defendant (bailee) not 
liable for damage to tractor where cause of damage could not 
be determined). 
On the basis of the rules which govern a cause of 
action in bailment and the evidence produced at trial, Brown 
is not liable for the damages to Diumenti's airplane. 
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First, the trial court made no findings or conclusions that 
Brown failed to exercise due care in his operation of the 
aircraft. Second, Brown testified at length and the trial 
court agreed, that he exercised all due care while flying 
and attempting to land the airplane. Finally, in response 
to this evidence, Diumenti was unable to offer any evidence 
to show either that Brown was negligent or that Brown's 
conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to the 
airplane. Essentially, Diumenti has left to speculation, 
the cause of the damage to his airplane. Because none of 
the elements necessary for assigning liability to Brown have 
been meet, Brown cannot be held liable. 
B. The Trial Court Made No Finding That Brown Was Negligent 
or that His Conduct Was the Proximate Cause Of the Damage To 
the Airplane. 
Already this Court emphasized that the trial court "did 
not make any findings or conclusions concerning negligence, 
which is the basis for liability in a cause of action for 
bailment." Decision in First Appeal at 3 (citations omit-
ted) . Despite this requirement, the trial court found Brown 
liable on the basis of bailment without making any findings 
or conclusions concerning negligence. Because the trial 
court has not complied with the requirements mandated by 
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this Court for finding Brown liable for damage to the 
airplane, the trial court made a fatal error in its assign-
ment of liability to Brown. As this Court has already 
noted, without a factual finding or legal conclusion that 
Brown was negligent, he cannot be held labile for damage to 
the airplane. 
C. At Trial, Brown Established that He Exercised All Due 
Care In His Operation Of the Aircraft. 
The trial court made no finding that Brown failed to 
exercise due care in his operation of the airplane because 
it could not. The evidence at trial confirmed that Brown 
completely fulfilled his duty to exercise reasonable care 
while he flew and landed the airplane. 
Brown relied on over four thousand (4,000) hours of 
flight time in the Air Force, (Primary Trial Transcript at 
9), in addition to four (4) years of commercial flying 
experience when he flew the airplane. Id. at 7. Brown was 
familiar with the controls and operation of the airplane 
before the accident. When he flew the airplane to Idaho as 
a copilot, he made several partial landings of the aircraft 
which required Brown to operate the landing gear three or 
four times. Id. at 60. Before the accident, Brown also 
took forty-five (45) minutes on a couple occasions to 
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familiarize himself with the controls of the airplane. Id. 
at 18-19. 
At trial, Brown also explained the prelanding checklist 
that he utilized to prepare for landing the airplane just 
before the accident. Primary Trial Transcript at 210-212. 
In response to Ritter's landing gear challenge, Brown 
lowered the gear with the proper lever, saw the lowered nose 
gear in an exterior mirror designed for this purpose, felt 
the initial buffet that occurs when the gear is lowered and 
saw the light that indicates that the gear is lowered and 
locked. Id. at 211. 
A few miles from the airport, Ritter again made the 
landing gear challenge and Brown again checked that the 
handle was in the down position, looked at the extended nose 
gear in the mirror and saw that the gear-down light was on, 
before he responded that the gear was down and locked. Id. 
at 212-213. From the time that the landing gear was lowered 
and locked, Brown and Ritter continued to feel a drag that 
occurs when the landing gear is locked into the down 
position. Id. Finally, Brown testified that after the 
crash, but before leaving the airplane, he checked and 
determined that the landing gear lever was still in the down 
position. Id. at 216. 
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The testimony of Ritter fully collaborates Brown's 
testimony that the landing gear was indeed down and locked 
when the airplane approached the runway and that Brown, as 
pilot, followed all standard procedures to land the airplane 
properly. Id. at 95 & 97. Paul Johnson, another exper-
ienced pilot, testified that once while piloting Diumenti's 
airplane, he had experienced a problem with the landing 
gear, fid, at 185), and twice had the engines quit on him 
upon landing the aircraft. Id. at 188. 
Clearly, Brown has proven that he was not negligent in 
his operation of the airplane. By all accounts, Brown was 
extremely thorough and careful both in his flying and 
preparation to land the aircraft. On the basis of the 
evidence, Brown has readily met the burden of overcoming any 
presumption that he was negligent in the operation of the 
aircraft. Because Brown was not negligent, he cannot be 
liable for any damage to the airplane.9 
9
 While Brown has proven that he was not negligent in 
his operation of the airplane, he does not have the burden 
of showing that he was not at fault. Because the trial 
court made no finding that the airplane was in Brown's 
exclusive possession before the May 9 flight, the pre-
sumption of Brown's negligence — based on the damage of the 
aircraft — cannot be made. 
The evidence also shows that Brown was not in exclusive 
possession of the airplane. Before the accident, neither 
Ritter nor Brown had the keys to the airplane. Primary 
Trial Transcript at 148 & 208. During this time, the 
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D. At Trial, Diumenti Did Not Provide Any Evidence To 
Establish that Brown Was Negligent In His Operation Of the 
Aircraft. 
As established above, a plaintiff (bailor) has the 
ultimate burden of showing that the defendant (bailee) was 
negligent. Romey, 111 P.2d at 547. When the bailee has 
responded to a prima facie presumption of negligence by 
showing that she was not at fault, the plaintiff must offer 
evidence to counter the defendants contention that she 
acted reasonably. Staheli, 655 P.2d at 683, fn.l. Other-
wise, the bailee is cleared of any liability for damage to 
the bailed property. Id. In addition, if a plaintiff is 
able to establish negligence, he must also show that this 
negligence was the proximate cause of any damage to the 
bailed property. Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 687. Because 
Diumenti has not provided any evidence which casts doubt on 
the reasonableness of Brown's operation of the aircraft or 
aircraft was sometimes parked on the ramp at the Salt Lake 
Airport and was sometimes gone from that location. Id. 
Finally, there is no evidence that the airplane was in 
good working order before the May 9 flight. Diumenti also 
has obligations under any alleged bailment contract. As the 
bailor, he has an obligation "that the thing or property 
bailed for use shall be reasonably fit for the purposes or 
capable of the use known or intended.11 Aircraft Sales & 
Service v. Gantt, 52 So.2d 388, 391 (Ala. 1951) (citations 
omitted). lf[I]f the use of the instrumentality threatens 
serious danger to others unless it is in good condition, 
there is a duty to take reasonable care to ascertain its 
condition by inspection." Id. (citations omitted). 
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that Brown,s conduct was the proximate cause of the damage 
to the airplane, Diumenti cannot sustain his damage claim 
against Brown. 
Diumenti has provided no evidence that Brown failed to 
exercise due care. None of the witnesses testifying at 
trial would even speculate as to the cause of the accident. 
No witness was called or evidence presented which pointed to 
any error or failure on the part of Brown. Instead, the 
testimony was limited to assertions that the landing gear on 
airplanes, in general, and the particular airplane at issue, 
usually functions properly. Importantly, Diumenti has 
merely speculated on the cause of the damage to his 
airplane, offering no real proof as to the cause of the 
accident. 
Diumenti's first witness, Donald Magnuson, the FAA 
official who was required by law to investigate this 
accident, testified his report of the accident contained no 
opinion as to the causes of the accident. Primary Trial 
Transcript at 67. While the landing gear was retracted when 
Magnuson inspected the airplane and he later tested the gear 
(without the weight of the airplane on it) and found it 
functioning, Magnuson refuse to make any suggestions 
concerning what (or who) caused the accident or whether the 
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landing gear was functioning properly when the airplane 
attempted to land. Id. at 62-72. 
Ron Nelson, an experienced pilot did not see the 
airplane after the accident. Id. at 243. He too was also 
unable to speculate on the cause of the accident. Id. at 
239. Allen Woodhouse, who helped repair the airplane after 
the accident, testified that according to his experience, 
there is no way to raise the landing gear except with the 
lever intended for that function. Id. at 256. However, 
Woodhouse also was unable to speculate on the cause of the 
accident. Id. at 247-256. 
This evidence does not erode the conclusion that Brown 
completely fulfilled his duty of care in operating the 
airplane. No one could determine the cause of the accident 
and no one could point to any instance where Brown failed to 
exercise due care in his operation of the airplane. As a 
result, the evidence that Brown was without fault stands 
unchallenged• 
Indeed, the trial court apparently agreed, remarking at 
the close of Diumenti's case that 
[t]here's no testimony that they [Ritter and 
Brown] failed to do anything. The testimony as I 
understand it and the state of the evidence is 
simply that the aircraft crashed because the 
landing gear was not in the down position — 
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either was not in a down position or was in the 
down position and collapsed. 
Primary Trial Transcript at 75. Where the evidence leaves 
to conjecture the cause of an injury, where there is more 
than one probable cause why the injury occurred, no recovery 
can be had. Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 683. "While deduction may 
be based on probabilities, the evidence must do more than 
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability." Sumsion 
at 683. Because Diumenti has done nothing more than raise 
the possibility that the accident could have been caused by 
Brown's negligence, but has done nothing to prove this 
conjecture, Diumenti is not entitled to recover from Brown. 
Id.10 
IV. Diumenti's Cause of Action Against Brown For Negligence 
Should Be Dismissed Because There Was No Evidence At Trial 
That Brown Was Negligent In His Operation Of The Airplane. 
Unlike under a bailment theory, a plaintiff, proceeding 
under on the basis of ordinary negligence, has the entire 
burden of showing that the defendant was at fault — there 
is no presumption of negligence in a routine cause of action 
for failure to exercise due care. For the reasons stated 
10
 Importantly, Diumenti also failed to show that 
Brown's conduct — much less his negligent conduct — was 
the proximate cause of the accident. 
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above, that, (1) Brown proved that he was not negligent in 
his operation of the aircraft; (2) Diumenti offered no 
evidence to counter Brown,s demonstration that he exercised 
due care; and, (3) Diumenti has left to speculation, the 
cause of the damage to his airplane, this Court should 
dismiss Diumenti7s negligence cause of action against Brown. 
To avoid subjecting Brown to further meritless litigation in 
this case, this court should conclude that Diumenti was 
unable to prove that Brown was negligent or that Brown's 
actions were the cause of the damage to the airplane. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the arguments above and the evidence in 
this case, this Court should find that Brown is not liable 
for the damage to Diumenti7s airplane. 
On the basis of the trial court's early dismissal of 
Diumenti's contract claim against Brown and the evidence at 
trial, this court should determine that no expressed or 
implied bailment existed between Diumenti and Brown. All 
agreements concerning the airplane were between only 
Diumenti and Ritter. 
However, even if Brown were party to a bailment, this 
Court should refuse to find Brown liable for damages to the 
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airplane on the basis of this agreement. Brown could not be 
liable on any express insurance agreement in connection with 
bailment because the trial court already determined that he 
was never party to any express agreement. Furthermore, in 
the absence of express terms, Brown had no duty to insure 
the airplane. Thus, without a finding of negligence — and 
the trial court made no such finding — Brown cannot liable 
for the damages to the airplane. 
Finally, this Court should determine that because the 
evidence shows that Brown exercised all reasonable care in 
his operation of the aircraft, he can not be liable for 
damage to the plane. For his bailment claim, Diumenti 
offered no evidence to counter the ample proof that Brown 
exercised due care in his flying of the airplane. Diumenti 
has merely speculated as to the cause of the accident and 
has offered no proof that Brown7s conduct was the proximate 
cause of the ill fated landing. As a result, Diumenti 
cannot require that Brown pay for the damage to the airplane 
on the basis of either bailment or negligence. Brown ful-
filled all his legal responsibilities to Diumenti — 
Diumenti cannot seek compensation from Brown. 
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Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
ruling below and should order dismissal of all of Diumenti's 
claims against Brown with prejudice. 
DATED this 11th day of April, 1994. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Brown 
Appellant/Defendant 
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APPENDIX 
45 
MARSHALED FACTS RE: EXPRESS AGREEMENT 
CONCERNING INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
DEFENDANT LARRY BROWN'S 
USE OF DIUMENTI'S AIRPLANE 
Transcript of April 4 and 5, 1989 
Page Line Subject 
TESTIMONY OF BROWN 
8 14-15 1974-80: pattern of leasing, renting, borrowing 
airplanes; "whatever was needed, not on a particular 
basis." 
8 22-23 Sometimes it would be more than a year between 
flights. 
9 10 Averaged less than 20 hours a year. 
10-12 General pattern of leasing planes for business. 
15 13-14 Diumenti required Brown to co-pilot an instruction 
trip from Salt Lake City to Pocatello; Brown received 
instruction on basic maneuvers, particularly landing 
the Cessna 414. 
15 22 Brown landed the plane three or four times at 
Pocatello. 
24 22 During "1980 to 1984" leased six or eight aircraft, 
possibly more. 
Mercury Air Courier Service was the lessee. 
Brown was not usually involved in negotiating leases; 
that was primarily Ritter's job. 
The leases were "absolutely written always." 
Brown assumed there was insurance covering him on the 
"training" flight from SLC to Pocatello; he assumed 
the primary pilot (the instructor pilot) was covered 
by insurance. 
33 12 Brown had no contact with the plaintiffs concerning 
leasing their aircraft on May 9, the day of the 
accident. 
33 15 Brown did not speak with Diumenti in May about using 
the aircraft. 
34 11-24 Brown did speak with Diumenti twice in April "to 
explore the possibility of using his aircraft." 
35 15-22 Brown and Diumenti spoke "only in the most general 
terms" about use of the aircraft, its capabilities, 
Brown's experience, Ritter's experience, insurance, 
possible location of the aircraft, hangaring, and 
terms of a lease arrangement. 
25 
25 
25 
26 
1 
17-18 
21 
24-25 
Brown and Diumenti discussed Mercury Courier's written 
leases, about negotiating a price for the use of the 
aircraft. 
Brown and Diumenti specifically discussed getting a 
waiver for Brown for coverage under Diumenti's 
insurance because Brown did not meet the open pilot 
clause on the insurance policy which Diumenti had. 
Brown and Ritter showed Diumenti what their insurance 
policies looked like. 
Brown did not enter a written lease agreement with 
Diumenti at that time. 
No lease was entered because the details had not been 
worked out; they had not gotten to the point where any 
of the necessary arrangements had been made. 
Mercury Air Courier (MAC) was leasing other aircraft. 
Those aircraft were insured. 
MAC had no aircraft at that time where the lessor was 
insuring the aircraft. 
MAC did not intend to insure Diumenti's aircraft 
because 
there were different needs and uses involved; Diumenti 
wanted to use his pilots, and MAC'S policy could not 
have accommodated that. 
the next time Brown had any conversation with Diumenti 
was when they were getting into the airplane to fly to 
Pocatello. 
Brown's discussions with Ritter focused on the 
mechanical status of the airplane. 
As of May 9, 1984, the date the plane was damaged, 
Brown's understanding was that the plane was not under 
a lease. 
Brown understood the plane was being used for purposes 
of checking it out, weighing it, "that sort of thing." 
A mechanic employed and paid by MAC removed the 
propellers for repair. He was not paid by Diumenti. 
MAC paid for the repair work. 
Brown "knew" all MAC'S leases were written because he 
believed he saw all of them; Ritter would say the 
lease had been prepared; also he believed he had a 
copy of each of them. 
Brown did not execute any of the leases. 
MAC was responsible for insurance for all the other 
planes it leased. 
ii 
52 1 Brown knew that the meeting with Diumenti at Ritter's 
home was about an aircraft. He did not know Diumenti 
and he did not know about the plane. 
52 12-16 Brown was introduced to Diumenti as the chief pilot 
for, specifically, Mercury Air Courier Service. 
52 22 The conversation was in general terms. 
53 2 There was no specific agreement reached as to use of 
the airplane. 
53 14-20 There was specific discussion about getting an 
insurance waiver for Brown; Diumenti said he had 
already done so for another pilot with far less 
experience than Brown, and that he saw no reason why 
he couldn't get insurance for Brown. 
53 22-23 Brown's understanding was that Diumenti would take 
care of insurance. 
54 1 Brown does not believe that entering a formal lease 
was a contingency for Diumenti getting Brown insured. 
54 7-12 The only agreement resulting from that meeting was 
that Brown would go along on a flight to be checked 
out. 
55 1 Brown was not aware of any further agreements being 
reached between Diumenti, Ritter, Brown or any entity 
regarding the plane. 
55 10 After the training flight to Pocatello, there was no 
conditional, specific agreement entered into with 
Diumenti. 
55 15 Brown engaged in no negotiations regarding leasing the 
plane during that flight to Pocatello. 
5 5 18 That was the only other occasion Brown had any contact 
with Diumenti. 
55 22 Brown had no further contact with any agents or 
individuals who indicated they were acting on behalf 
of Diumenti or the owner of the plane. 
56 3 Brown did not make the arrangements for the propeller 
to be repaired; Ritter made the arrangements and paid 
for them. 
57 6 Brown had no additional understanding of any agreement 
with the owners regarding use of the airplane. 
5 7 9 Brown had seen no written lease. 
57 11 Brown had seen no draft of a lease. 
5 7 14-20 Brown had discussed with Ritter the potential terms of 
a written lease. 
57 23-25 MAC'S leases were not all identical; the terms were 
customized for each transaction. 
iii 
9 Ritter had told Brown that a lease had not been 
entered into regarding the Cessna 414. 
4-5 On May 9, the date of the flight from SLC to Tooele, 
Brown knew of no further understanding reached with 
the owners of the plane regarding use of the plane, 
"for purposes of Mercury Air Courier Service." 
8-18 Brown was instructed by Ritter to fly the aircraft to 
Tooele, refuel it, fly it to Logan to be weighed and 
return to SLC. There were no additional instructions. 
21 Brown had no permission directly from the owners to 
use the plane on May 9th. 
1-3 Brown had no understanding of any specific agreement 
beyond the "vague discussion" at Ritter's house. 
OF DIUMENTI (PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT) 
8-16 Ritter contacted Diumenti and expressed interest in 
leasing the Cessna 414. Diumenti said he would ask 
his partner and get back to Ritter. 
17-21 Diumenti called Ritter back on April 27; he said they 
were interested in leasing the aircraft. 
2-5 The purpose of the meeting at Ritter's home was to 
review the aircraft and the owners' willingness to 
lease, also to learn more about Ritter and his 
intended use. 
6-13 Diumenti understood that Ritter was representing 
himself; there was no representation about any third 
party being involved. 
16-24 Diumenti took several documents to the meeting; among 
them were the current INA insurance contract; and "an 
outline of the basis upon which Mr. Allred was trying 
to fathom a partnership would be willing to lease the 
aircraft." 
10-13 Brown was introduced to Diumenti as an individual; the 
individual who would fly the airplane for Ritter's 
purposes under a potential lease. 
2-3 Ritter had two basic purposes for a potential lease: 
cargo and humans. Diumenti, Ritter and Brown discussed 
these purposes. 
6-12 Specific terms of a leasing arrangement were discussed 
that evening by Diumenti, Ritter and Brown. 
15-20 There were no negotiations. Diumenti told Ritter and 
Brown under what terms he and his partner would be 
interested in leasing the plane. 
23 Diumenti understood that an agreement was reached at 
that meeting. 
iv 
10 1-24 Diumenti understood that Ritter would lease the plane 
under the following terms: 
Ritter and the partnership with ownership interest in 
the plane would share, pro rata, the costs of taxes, 
costs, maintenance, and fees based on the number of 
hours that each used the plane. Each party would pay 
their own fuel & oil. cost of repairs would be 
allocated ad hoc. Ritter would pay $100 per hour for 
use of the aircraft. 
11 2-8 Terms relative to insuring the plane were discussed. 
The open pilot warranty in Diumenti's insurance was 
discussed. 
11 18-25 Under the pilot provision, the insurance company would 
waive a pilot who had years of experience on a parti-
cular aircraft. Brown had many more hours of flying 
experience than pilots the insurance company had 
already waived (but not in the Cessna 414). 
11 25- A significant part of the evening was centered around 
12 1 discussing insurance. 
12 2-6 Brown and Ritter said they knew Diumenti's insurance 
broker and that "if the matter were consummated" Brown 
would immediately get with the broker to get the 
necessary waivers to be added to the policy. 
14 16-24 The obtaining of coverage for Brown was specifically 
discussed on Sunday, April 29. The substance of the 
discussion was "essentially, that should the 
transaction be consummated," that Ritter and Brown 
would seek open pilot insurance waiver for Brown. 
15 12-17 Diumenti's understanding was that no additional 
premium would be required by the insurance company to 
add Brown to the policy; Diumenti had no discussion 
with Brown or Ritter concerning additional premiums. 
15 21-24 Diumenti recalls no discussion concerning Brown and 
Ritter obtaining their own insurance coverage. Such a 
discussion would have been contrary to the desires of 
Diumenti and his partner. 
16 4 Diumenti believed he had a specific understanding with 
Ritter and Brown about how the airplane would be 
insured if they were to use the airplane. 
16 8-13 Diumenti understood that waiver on his policy was "the 
minimum that would be expected of them and required." 
He added that "should they be engaged in services or 
transactions that weren't covered by our policy, they 
would obtain insurance for those situations." 
18 4 The agreement Diumenti understood he had reached with 
Ritter and Brown was not modified or changed prior to 
the flight to Pocatello; that flight took place the 
very next morning. 
v 
18 11-21 There were two purposes for the April 30th flight to 
Pocatello: Diumenti had business to transact, and 
Diumenti had arranged for an instructor pilot to fly 
the plane so that "Brown could get the required number 
of take-offs and landings prior to their taking 
possession of the airplane and making use of it." 
19 20-22 Diumenti had no other conversations with Ritter or 
Brown that modified his understanding of what the 
agreement was. 
19 24-25 Ritter, Brown and Diumenti arranged that MAC would 
20 1-17 repair the propeller. They agreed Ritter would get a 
credit on the $100/hour, they would pay to get the 
propeller repaired, and miscellaneous adjustments 
would be made to credit them for the cost of such 
repair. Diumenti was told MAC could get it done more 
cheaply than he could because MAC was "in the 
business." 
20 24-25 Typically, the pilot of the plane would make 
arrangements for any repairs found necessary. 
21 9 Ritter made the arrangements for the propeller to be 
repaired. 
21 12 Diumenti had several conversations with Ritter between 
April 30th (Pocatello flight) and May 9 (Tooele 
flight). 
21 14-25 On May 9 they discussed the incident at Tooele 
airport; on May 3, 1984, Ritter informed Diumenti of 
the nature of and arrangements for repairs to the 
propeller, "and that they would be using the aircraft 
as we had agreed prior to May 1st." 
30 21 The "outline" referred to at p. 7, is something 
Diumenti prepared and took to the April 29 meeting. 
31 2-24 Diumenti has not found a copy of the outline. 
32 9 Diumenti has not asked Ritter or Brown for a copy. 
32 21-23 The outline "essentially described the bases upon 
which Triangle Travel (the partnership of Diumenti and 
Allred) would be willing to lease the aircraft." 
32 25- The outline did not contain a $100/hour rate; that was 
33 1 discussed at the meeting. 
33 5 The discussions at the meeting at Ritter's home were 
predominately with Ritter. 
33 9-10 Diumenti understood that Ritter was the lessee. 
33 15-21 Diumenti recalls testifying earlier that "the basis 
upon which Triangle Travel was willing to lease the 
aircraft" was that Ritter's pilot (Brown) "would be 
added to our policy and that any use beyond the use 
prescribed in the policy ... would be a use insured by 
them, if it were not already insured in the policy." 
VI 
34 22-25 Diumenti testified at his deposition that "Ritter and 
35 1-10 Brown could carry the insurance ... " 
36 1-2 Diumenti never had a telephone conversation with 
Brown. 
36 15-18 Diumenti understood that the terms of the lease were 
finalized on Sunday, April 28 (?), 1984, subject to 
only two things: Brown's inspection and check-out in 
the aircraft and the obtaining of insurance. 
42 8 The name of Mercury Air Courier Service did not come 
up in Diumenti's first conversation with Ritter. 
42 11 No "agency" was disclosed by Ritter to Diumenti. 
43 4 Ritter did not indicate he was acting on behalf of the 
business entity in the April 27 phone call. 
43 15 Ritter did not indicate he was acting on behalf of MAC 
in the May 1 phone call* 
43 19 Ritter did not intimate in any way that he was acting 
on behalf of any other corporate or business entity. 
43 22-23 The same is true for the May 3 phone call. 
44 2-5 Diumenti believes that the first time he heard of MAC 
was the day of the crash or sometime in the week after 
the crash. 
44 9 Diumenti was never asked to allow the aircraft to be 
used by anyone other than Ritter and Brown. 
44 13 Diumenti was never asked to allow the aircraft to be 
used by a business entity called Mercury Air Courier 
Services. 
44 17 Diumenti had never asked for information regarding 
MAC. 
45 11 Diumenti was not given any documents with the name 
Mercury Air Courier Services on them. 
45 15-17 One of the two conditions which weren't taken care of 
on Sunday was that Ritter wanted Brown to inspect the 
plane, fly it ... 
46 1-6 Ritter called Diumenti on May 1, indicated that the 
plane was fine, he wanted it, Brown liked it, and 
discussed the propeller problem - specifically that 
arrangements would be made to fix it, and that Ritter 
could get it done more cheaply than Diumenti. 
46 17-19 Diumenti would not have allowed the repairs to be done 
by Ritter if he had not believed there was an 
agreement. 
46 23-24 It was Diumenti's understanding after speaking with 
Ritter on May 1 that the deal was consummated. 
47 2-5 Diumenti spoke with Ritter on the 1st and the 3rd 
vii 
about insurance. Ritter told Diumenti on the 3rd that 
he had not "heard back" from the insurance broker. 
47 9 Ritter did not indicate to Diumenti that he was not 
going to get a waiver for Brown. 
47 12-13 Diumenti did not envision a written agreement 
& 19 with Ritter. 
47 22 There was no discussion on April 29 about a written 
contract. 
47 25 Ritter and Brown did not show Diumenti any sort of 
forms or written agreements. 
49 10-20 Diumenti believed that the terms of the deal were 
certain when he left Ritter's home on April 29 (?), 
subject only to inspection of the aircraft and Brown 
being added to the insurance policy. On May 1, Ritter 
acknowledged that Brown liked the aircraft, that there 
was a problem with the propeller, and that they were 
willing "to go ahead, have the thing fixed at their 
expense and credit it to the $100 per hour that would 
inure in the future." 
49 25 On May 1, Ritter called and said "'Mr. Brown likes the 
50 1-5 aircraft, the problem with the propeller he's 
discussed with me, we're going to go ahead and have 
that fixed; we can get it done cheaper than you. I'll 
be back with you directly if there's any other 
problems that the mechanics find.' That was said on 
May 1st." 
50 8-9 Diumenti believed that on Sunday, April 27 (?) they 
had "an oral agreement subject to a condition 
subsequent." 
50 14 Diumenti believed that on May 1st the conditions were 
performed and, at least, the lease was not refuted. 
50 20-21 At the April 29 (?) meeting at Ritter's, Brown 
represented that he would be the only pilot flying the 
plane, after being added to the policy. 
50 25 Brown made no other representations. 
51 3-6 Brown said he understood what he had to do to get a 
waiver on the policy; he did not say he would go and 
get insurance coverage. 
51 16-20 Diumenti told Brown on April 30 that he didn't expect 
the airplane to go anywhere until there was insurance. 
52 21-22 Diumenti's understanding was that the lease was (to 
be) between Triangle Travel and Ritter, not Brown. 
53 6-10 As of May 3, Diumenti "understood" that Ritter or 
Brown had already contacted the insurance broker; on 
the 3rd he asked Ritter whether they had heard back. 
viii 
55 11-14 Diumenti testified in deposition that he specifically 
did not recall asking about insurance for Brown in the 
phone call of May 3. 
56 1-5 Diumenti has refreshed his recollection since the 
deposition by reviewing his telephone logs; his 
recollection is "much clearer and more concise today 
than it was in August." 
57 15-18 Diumenti's memory "is thoroughly refreshed as to the 
subject matter of the conversations" he had with 
Ritter because he chronologies his calls, and reflects 
on the transaction ..• 
57 21 There is nothing in the phone message that says 
anything about insurance. 
TESTIMONY OF RITTER 
78 11-16 Ritter and Brown met with Diumenti because they were 
interested in negotiating a lease for his Cessna; they 
wanted to find out about the aircraft. 
79 21-25 Diumenti was adamant that the aircraft be insured 
under Diumenti's policy. 
80 17 Ritter showed Diumenti Ritter's insurance policy. 
80 21 The policy was in the name Mercury Air Courier 
Service. 
80 25 There was much discussion at the meeting about Brown's 
qualifications and experience and qualifying under 
Diumenti's insurance policy. 
Diumenti indicated he was going to "take care of" 
getting a waiver for Brown on Diumenti's policy. 
Brown did not at any time say that he would "take care 
of" getting waived onto Diumenti's insurance. 
There was extensive discussion of Mercury Air Courier; 
that there were three corporations. 
Ritter discussed the functions of the corporations. 
83 8 At the end of the meeting, Ritter did not understand 
that a lease had been finalized. 
83 12 An hourly rate for leasing the plane was not decided 
upon during the meeting. 
83 23 There were significant additional terms to be 
negotiated on the potential lease. 
84 2-5 The only oral leases MAC had on airplanes were with 
FNB Leasing, because of the commonality of ownership. 
All other leases were written. 
84 9-20 Terms which were not agreed upon: price per flying 
81 
81 
82 
82 
83 
18 
25 
4-16 
19-25 
1-4 
IX 
hour, whether there would be minimum hours per month, 
reserve requirements, where the aircraft would be 
hangared, whether the aircraft would be able to be 
flown Part 135 of the FAR. 
The FAA would have had to approve the airplane and 
"make and model" operation under Part 135. 
These terms were never resolved and agreed upon. 
Ritter never talked with Diumenti about contacting the 
insurance broker. 
A written lease agreement was never drafted regarding 
the Cessna 414 because negotiations never got that 
far. 
Ritter and Brown did discuss "written terms of the 
lease agreement." 
The night they met with Diumenti, Ritter and Brown had 
an opportunity to review the terms and conditions of 
Diumenti's insurance policy. 
Ritter thought it was the insurance broker's father 
who had the insurance agency. 
Diumenti's insurance policy had common boilerplate 
provisions. 
The open pilot provision required significantly 
greater hours than MAC'S policy. 
Ritter understood that Diumenti would "take care of" 
getting Brown warrantied under Diumenti's insurance 
policy. 
Ritter figured, since Diumenti was a lawyer - he knew 
how to "take care of it." 
Every other pilot with MAC was covered under MAC'S 
insurance policy. 
Ritter did not see "the outline" at the meeting; he 
does not accept that Diumenti brought all the 
documents he says he did; he only saw an equipment 
list and insurance policy. 
Ritter took MAC'S insurance policy to the meeting with 
Diumenti. 
Ritter disputes Diumenti's testimony that $100/hr had 
been agreed upon. 
Ritter was intending to prepare a written lease for 
the airplane. 
Ritter never began a draft of a written lease. 
Ritter did not begin to draft a lease because they 
"weren't that close to leasing the airplane," 
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133 
135 
19 
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128 14 Ritter does not specifically remember letting Diumenti 
examine the MAC insurance policy. 
128 24 It is possible that Ritter simply discussed the policy 
with Diumenti. 
131 3-4 All the aircraft leased by MAC from lessors other than 
FBN were under written leases. 
131 13 It was company policy to have written leases on all 
its aircraft. 
132 6 Ritter, as a lawyer, recognized the need for a written 
lease to determine responsibilities of the parties. 
132 14 At the end of April, beginning of May, all MAC 
aircraft were insured for their pilots and for their 
use. 
Aircraft insurance covers not only the pilots but also 
the use to which the aircraft is put. 
It was company policy to have insurance coverage for 
both use and pilot on all MAC'S aircraft. 
It was policy for MAC to obtain that insurance. 
At the time the propeller repairs were undertaken, 
Ritter did not believe he had an agreement with 
Diumenti regarding the Cessna 414. 
Ritter had permission from Diumenti to fix the plane. 
Ritter did not believe he would be at any risk if he 
did the repairs and then did not lease the plane. 
Ritter was familiar with the requirements of his 
insurance company for adding a new pilot; his policy 
provided "two-stage coverage." All he had to do was 
call with the name of a pilot and the pilot would be 
added to the policy. Then follow-up paperwork would be 
completed to verify qualifications. 
138 8 Ritter's testimony, as opposed to Diumenti's, is that 
Diumenti agreed to get Brown covered. 
138 16 Brown gave Diumenti information about his 
qualifications for purposes of Diumenti's getting 
Brown covered on Diumenti's insurance. 
138 18-22 Brown told Diumenti that he was a retired Air Force 
pilot, that the had so many thousand hours total time, 
that he had multi-engine experience, but no experience 
in the 414. 
139 1 Ritter believed that Diumenti had all he needed to get 
Brown covered on the policy. 
139 7 Diumenti indicated to Ritter and Brown that he had all 
he needed. 
135 
136 
136 
137 
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xi 
Getting the aircraft weighed was a condition precedent 
to the effectiveness of a lease agreement; the plane 
was not airworthy Part 135 without it, 
Ritter expected that the plane would pass the weight 
check. 
Following the weight check and the propeller repair, 
there still needed to be a prelease inspection by 
MAC'S mechanic. 
Ritter would have understood that he was going to 
"take this aircraft and use it in connection with this 
new flight service" after the prelease inspection; 
"assuming that the open items could have been 
satisfactorily resolved." 
Ritter intended to use the aircraft; that is why he 
was taking it for weighing. 
Ritter did not think about the issue of insurance when 
he knew Brown was going to fly the Cessna to Logan. 
Ritter did not stop to reflect on company policy of 
insuring all aircraft before using them. 
Ritter did not think what might happen to the aircraft 
while it was in his possession, and who would pay for 
the damage. 
Ritter did not bill Diumenti for the propeller repairs 
after the incident at Tooele. 
Ritter did testify that he thought that if he didn't 
lease the aircraft, that those repairs would be paid 
for by Diumenti. 
Brown was an employee of MAC on May 9, 1984; he was 
not in the personal employ of Ritter. 
MAC received approval to fly passengers between SLC 
and Logan toward the end of the summer of 1984. 
As of April 30, 1984 & May 9, 1984, MAC had no use for 
a passenger aircraft. 
Between April 29 and May 9, Ritter did not have the 
keys to the Cessna 414. 
Ritter does not know if Brown had the keys. 
MAC would not have been able to fly passengers in the 
Cessna without a F.A.R. 135 certificate. 
The Cessna was never leased by MAC from Diumenti. 
Ritter did not reflect on the issue of insurance on 
May 9 because it was Diumenti's airplane, they had 
permission to fly it, they were doing Diumenti a favor 
in taking it for weighing, so that it could be leased. 
xii 
156 9-11 Ritter believes that Diumenti hired MAC to get the 
propeller fixed and the airplane weighed. 
161 
162 
162 
162 
25 
3 
9 
15 
157 13 Ritter did not speak to Diumenti directly about 
repairing the propeller; he exchanged messages through 
Diumenti's office personnel and understood that he had 
been retained to have those services done. 
158 5 Ritter undertook the repairs pursuant to what he 
thought was an agreement with Diumenti. 
158 11 Ritter undertook to fly the plane for the weigh-in 
pursuant to what he understood to be an agreement 
based upon those telephone conversations. 
159 7 Diumenti never conveyed to Ritter that he had obtained 
insurance waiver for Brown. 
161 17 Ritter knew that for Brown to fly the airplane, an 
insurance waiver was required. 
Diumenti's insurance would not cover commercial 
passenger transport.. 
Diumenti's insurance would not cover the F.A.R. part 
135 use. 
Additional insurance would have been required for MAC 
to use the airplane for that use. 
When the aircraft took off from SLC on May 9, Brown 
was operating it. 
TESTIMONY OF COLLEEN RITTER 
199 25 Ms. Ritter was directly present in the same room with 
Diumenti probably half the time the meeting lasted. 
201 6-9 There were never any terms of a lease agreement that 
finalized; nothing was ever firmed up. 
201 12-20 Diumenti was emphatic that he would take care of the 
insurance; he said it would not be a problem and that 
he would take care of getting the waiver. 
201 22-25 The resolution of the meeting was that Ritter and 
Brown wanted to check over the plane, see if it met 
the part 135 qualifications, that they would stay in 
touch with Diumenti, and that Diumenti would take care 
of preparing the lease when it was ready. 
202 9 It was not Ms. Ritter's understanding the Ritter or 
Brown would fly the airplane until Diumenti presented 
a lease. 
202 12-18 Ritter and Brown were going to determine whether the 
plane met the 135 qualifications; Diumenti explained 
that he had a case in Idaho, and he invited Brown to 
go along to get checked out, and that his pilot would 
give Brown some training on the plane while Diumenti 
presented his case. 
xiii 
202 21 There was no other discussion about any other flights 
in thfe airplane. 
203 16-18 Diumenti was emphatic that whoever flew that plane 
would be covered by Diumenti's insurance. 
TESTIMONY OF BROWN 
206 20-25 Diumenti wanted Brown covered on Diumenti's policy 
because his policy allowed a continuous listing of 
pilots that would have been difficult to do with MAC'S 
policy. 
207 4-6 There was discussion at the meeting at Ritter's house 
to the effect that it would not be possible to engage 
in commercial activities under the policy as it was 
written. 
209 8-10 Between the Pocatello flight and May 9, the Cessna was 
parked in front of Thompson Beechcraft; it was gone 
between the times Brown observed it parked there. 
209 13-15 Brown did not have the keys to the Cessna during that 
time; Brown did not know where the keys were during 
that time. 
209 18 On the morning of May 9, Brown got the keys to the 
Cessna from the front desk at Thompson Beechcraft. 
209 20-24 Diumenti had notified Thompson Beechcraft that Brown 
would pick up the keys to the Cessna; there was a note 
on "the board" that Brown would pick them up. 
221 17-25 Diumenti told Brown at the meeting at Ritter's that he 
would arrange for the insurance. MAC'S procedure was 
that once the insurance company agreed to a new pilot, 
MAC would start to use him. Brown inferred from the 
fact that Diumenti cleared use of the plane that 
insurance had been arranged. 
222 3-9 Brown did not get clearance directly from Diumenti; 
Ritter had talked with Diumenti's secretary, who had 
talked with Diumenti. 
225 13 Brown knew only in general terms of the arrangements 
regarding the repairs to the Cessna 414 before May 9. 
225 15 Ritter took care of those arrangements; he was the 
business agent. 
225 20-22 Brown was not concerned that repairs were being made 
with no written agreement with the owner of the 
aircraft; he had no reason to doubt that there was an 
oral agreement which was enforceable. 
226 3 Brown did not personally inquire of Diumenti's 
insurance company as to whether he was covered to fly 
the plane to Logan. 
* * * 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
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Attorneys: Brian M. Barnard and John Pace, Salt Lake City, for 
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William H. Lindsley and James C. Lewis, Bountiful, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant Larry H. Brown appeals the trial court's ruling 
that he breached an oral agreement to obtain insurance to protect 
against damage to plaintiffs' airplane, which was leased to 
Arthur J. Ritter and Brown. 
The trial court found that in 1984, Ritter and Brown leased 
plaintiffs' airplane. The covurt also found that the parties 
orally agreed that Brown and Ritter would use the airplane only 
after they had been added to plaintiffs' insurance or after they 
had obtained their own insurance. Pursuant to this agreement, 
the parties understood that the insurance would cover the use of 
the airplane by Ritter and Brown. The court further found that 
Ritter and Brown failed to obtain the requisite insurance. 
On May 9, 1984, the airplane, while in the possession of 
Ritter and Brown, was damaged during a landing at the Tooele 
Valley Airport. When the accident occurred, neither Brown nor 
Ritter were covered by plaintiffs' existing insurance policy on 
r DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 
the airplane, nor had they obtained insurance covering their 
operation of the airplane. 
Plaintiffs sued Ritter and Brown claiming (1) breach of 
contract; (2) negligence; and (3) bailment. The case was tried 
in April 1989. After plaintiffs' case in chief, Brown moved to 
dismiss plaintiffs7 breach of contract claim, which motion was 
granted. The court took the matter under advisement after the 
trial. 
The court issued a memorandum decision on June 14, 1989, 
adjudicating defendants liable, jointly and severally, to 
plaintiffs based on a contractual theory. On July 18, 1989, the 
court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment. The court ruled that defendants7 liability was based 
solely on a breach of contract by failing to obtain insurance to 
cover damage to the airplane. The court did not refer to 
plaintiffs7 negligence or bailment causes of action in its 
memorandum decision, findings, or conclusions. 
Brown argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment 
against him on a contractual theory. We do not defer to the 
court7s legal conclusion concerning the imposition of liability 
for breach of contract, but review it for correctness. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Brown claims that the court misled him by dismissing the 
first cause of action alleging a contract between the parties and 
subsequently imposing liability based on breach of contract. 
Thus, he contends the court deprived him of the opportunity to 
defend against the breach of contract claim in his case in chief. 
In contrast, plaintiffs argue that their bailment cause of action 
also sounded in contract, and that the court based its ruling on 
the bailment cause of action rather than on the breach of 
contract claim, which was previously dismissed. Plaintiffs7 
argument is without merit. We recognize that the "relation 
[between] bailor and bailee is created in contract." Potomac 
Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, 448 (1924); see 
also Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc. , 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 
685 (1943) ("the entire duty of the bailee with respect to the 
bailed chattel is based on the bailment contract").1 The court, 
however, did not refer to bailment in its memorandum decision, 
1. A bailment is created when a party7s personal property is 
delivered to another "in trust for a specific purpose, with an 
express or implied contract that the property will be returned or 
accounted for when the specific purpose has been accomplished or 
when the bailor reclaims the property." Christensen v. Hoover, 
643 P.2d 525, 528-29 (Colo. 1982). 
^ 
findings, or conclusions• Moreover, the court did not make any 
findings or conclusions concerning negligence, which is the basis 
for liability in a cause of action for bailment. Sumsionr 132 
P.2d at 685-86; see also Barlow Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel, 
533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975) (a "bailee has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care and caution commensurate with acceptance of the 
responsibility of safekeeping the property of others entrusted to 
him"). 
Therefore, we conclude that the court erred when, after 
dismissing the first cause of action for breach of contract, it 
concluded that Brown was liable to plaintiffs for breach of 
contract. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)r the 
dismissal "operates as an adjudication on the merits" of the 
breach of contract claim.2 In reliance on the courts dismissal, 
Brown did not present evidence in defense of the breach of 
contract claim. Because Brown was prejudiced3 by the dismissal 
and subsequent ruling based on breach of contract, we reverse the 
trial courts judgment and remand for a determination of the 
2. Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
relevant part: 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
for in this rule . . . operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
3. Cf. Radlev v. Smith. 6 Utah 314, 313 P.2d 465, 467 (1957) 
("[a] party who is advised of the issues and given full and fair 
opportunity to meet them is in no position to claim surprise or 
error as to the issues litigated"); National Farmers Union 
Property and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 
253 (1955) ("if an issue is to be tried and a party's rights 
concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and 
an opportunity to meet it"); Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 545, 236 
P.2d 451, 455 (1951) (court did not err in reinstating previously 
dismissed count because "[t]here is no showing that the 
defendants were misled or prevented from presenting all their 
evidence or in any way prejudiced by reinstating the count") . 
n«i nnA n _ /"»* 
negligence and bailment claims on which t h e cour t d i d not ru le . 
Inasmuj^^Ss^the p a r t i e s hav^ presented a l l t h e i r evidence , we see 
no rygted for A new t s i a l . 
fegnal W. Garff, Judge/V 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, kludge 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and, 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR, 
J. RITTER 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C86-3354 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
On June 8, 1993, defendant's Motion to Amend Findings came on for oral argument, with 
James C. Lewis appearing for plaintiffs, and Brian Barnard appearing for defendant. The matter 
was fully argued and submitted. Based upon the pleadings submitted in this matter, and oral 
argument, the Court finds as follows: 
[ EXHIBIT "b" 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1984, plaintiffs delivered to defendants sole possession and control of a twin 
engine Cessna 414 (the "airplane"). 
2. After taking sole possession and control of the airplane, defendant made use of the 
airplane. 
3. Defendant Brown was present and participated at a meeting wherein the lease or 
use of the aircraft was discussed. In addition, at such meeting, the parties, and defendant Brown 
discussed specifically obtaining insurance on the plane. 
4. On or about May 9, 1984, while defendant Brown was piloting the plane, the 
airplane crashed at the Tooele Valley Airport, resulting in substantial property damage in the sum 
of $33,133.86. 
5. Prior to the airplane crash, defendant Brown flew the plane, did landings on a 
flight to Pocatello, Idaho, under the supervision of the owners and a pilot they had retained for 
that flight. Defendant Brown inspected and viewed the plane on various other occasions prior 
to the airplane crash to make sure that he knew where the controls were, their functions and how 
operate them. 
6. Prior to the airplane crash, Brown inquired of the airplane's physical condition in 
conversations with Bart Harker, the individual who Brown described as "our mechanic and who 
was doing some work on the airplane. 
7. In connection with the delivery of possession and control of the airplane to 
defendants, defendants agreed to obtain insurance on the aircraft. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The evidence before the Court supports a finding that possession and control of the 
airplane was delivered to defendants under a bailment arrangement, and that defendants were 
bailees under such arrangement. 
8. The evidence further supports a finding that, under the bailment, there was an 
express agreement between the parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the 
airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants possession. 
9. During the time the airplane was in defendant's possession, defendants, as bailees, 
had sole possession and right to control the airplane. 
10. As a result of defendants failure to obtain insurance, plaintiffs were damaged in 
the sum of $33,133.86. 
11. That defendants, as bailees of the airplane, were responsible for any damages 
caused to the aircraft as a result of their failure to obtain insurance as agreed. 
12. That plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against defendant Brown for the sum of 
$33,133.86, together with interest thereon from December, 1986. 
Dated this day of July, 1993. 
James S. Sawaya 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this t-t-*o day of July, 1993, to: 
Brian M. Barnard, Utah Legal Clinic, 214 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204. 
SSk^ok-
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James C. Lewis #1943 
DIUMENTT, LEWIS & HART 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and, 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR 
J. ROTER, 
Defendant 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. C86-3354 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The mat te r of defendant Larry H. Brown's Motion t o Amend 
Findings came on for hea r ing on June, 8, 1993, before Judge James 
S. Sawaya; p l a i n t i f f s were represented by counse l , James C. Lewis; 
defendant was r ep resen ted by counsel, Br ian M. Barnard. The matter 
was f u l l y p resen ted , argued and submitted, and the Cour t ' s decis ion 
thereon was taken under advisement. The Cour t having reviewed the 
p leadings and the ev idence in the matter , and having considered the 
submissions and arguments of counsel, and hav ing t he r e to fo r e signed 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
"c" 
and f i l e d here in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
enters judgment as fo l lows: 
P l a i n t i f f s a re g ran ted judgment agains t defendant, Larry H. 
Brown, i n the sum of $33,133.86, plus i n t e r e s t thereon from 
December 1, 1986 through August 15, 1993 in t he sum of $29,270.59, 
for a t o t a l judgment of $62,404.45. 
Dated t h i s 1 ^ day of S ^ K ^ 7 ) b t A . 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
M 
JAMES S. SAWAYA 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed first class, postage prepaid on 
this 36?aay of August, 1993 to: 
Brian M. Barnard 
John Pace 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB #0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
LARRY H. BROWN 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J. RITTER, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
: Civil No. C-86-3354 
: (Hon. J. Sawaya) 
DEFENDANT LARRY H. BROWN hereby gives notice of his 
appeal of that judgment entered against him in the above 
matter as a result of the hearing in this matter on June 8, 
1993, represented by a Minute Entry of June 17, 1993 and 
embodied in an Order and Judgment served upon defendant's 
counsel on August 30, 1993. 
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
"d" 
DATED this 9th day of SEPTEMBER, 1993. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the- foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY 
JAMES C. LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
on the 4TH day of SEPTEMBER, 1993, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
bmb\C:\REGCASE\MERCAPPE.NOT 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0 2 1 5 
JOHN PACE USB # 5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys f o r Defendant/Appellant 
LARRY H. BROWN 
214 East F i f t h South 
Sa l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J. RITTER, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
i & AMENDED FINDINGS & 
FOR MORE FINDINGS 
' (Memo Included) 
: Civil No. C-86-3354 
. $1,-0^0-5351} 
i (Hon. J. Sawaya) 
The remaining defendant Larry H. Brown, by and through 
counsel, Brian M. Barnard and John Pace moves t h i s Court 
pursuant t o Rule 52(b) and Rule 5 g ( a ) & (e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for a new trial, to make additional 
f indings , and t o amend f indings a n d in support of t h a t 
motion s t a t e s as fo l lows: 
Negligence 
1. There has been a cause of act ion and claim of 
negl igence a s s e r t e d in t h i s a c t i o n . The negl igence i s 
f DEFENDANT'S 1 EXHIBIT I 
alleged to have occurred at about the time defendant Brown 
landed the subject matter aircraft at the Tooele County 
Airport. 
2. No evidence presented at trial establishes 
negligence on the part of defendant Larry Brown. The 
testimony from Brown indicated that on approach to the 
Tooele County Airport for landing, he had engaged the 
landing gear, and that he had then verified visually on the 
exterior and in the interior by a check of an indicator 
light that the landing gear was in a down position ready for 
landing the airplane. He testified that he knew the landing 
gear was down upon approach and shortly before the plane was 
to touch down. Brown had no explanation as to why the 
landing gear was not in its proper place when the plane came 
into contact with the run way. It is just as likely that 
the equipment mal-functioned or was defective as it is that 
Brown breached any duty of care. Similarly, the plaintiffs 
presented no explanation as to why the landing gear was not 
in its proper place when the plane came into contact with 
the run way. Plaintiff did not present eye witnesses nor 
proof as to the status of the gear. Plaintiffs offered no 
proof that the landing gear was in good working order. 
2 
3. There was no evidence presented by plaintiffs (as 
was their burden) to show negligence on the part of any one 
which caused the crash and the damage to the airplane. 
Plaintiffs have objected to defendant Brown's request that 
the negligence cause of action be formally dismissed herein, 
however, plaintiffs have not cited any evidence in the trial 
record nor from the transcript of the trial that establish 
that there was any negligence on the part of Brown that 
caused damage to plaintiffs' airplane. 
4. In order to finalize and resolve the question of 
negligence in this case, the Court should make a finding as 
to whether or not there was negligence. 
Bailment 
5. Defendant Brown requests this Court to make 
specific findings as to the nature and terms of the bailment 
which forms the basis for finding Brown liable for the harm 
suffered by plaintiffs. 
6. Defendant Brown requests this Court to make factual 
findings with specific citation to the Trial Report and 
Transcript as to the nature and terms of the bailment which 
forms the basis for finding Brown liable for the harm 
suffered by plaintiffs. 
3 
WHEREFORE, this Court should enter a finding that there 
was no negligence established or proved in this case and 
dismiss the plaintiffs' claim and cause of action sounding 
in negligence. Further, Brown requests the Court to enter 
specific findings (with citations to the trial record) as to 
the terms and nature of the bailment which is the basis for 
defendant Brown's liability herein. 
DATED this 23RD day of JUNE, 1993. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, NEW 
FINDINGS, MORE FINDINGS, ETC. to: 
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY 
JAMES C. LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
on the 23RD day of JUNE, 1993, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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BRIAN M..BARNARD USB § 0215 
JOHN PACE USB 4 5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East F i f t h South 
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9532 or 328-9532 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
DOUGLAS J . ALLRED and 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J . RITTER, 
Defendant 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
Case Number: 86-090-3354 
Judge: J . S away a 
The following motion{s) are now at Issue and ready for decision of the court The documents 
indicated have been filed with the court 
(a) Type
 Qfmotion: M o t i o n f o r N e w T r i a ^- & Amend Findings & 
taj ypcoimown.
 F o r M K Findings 
(b) Date filed: June 2 3 . 199.3 
(c) Party filing motion: Remaining Defendant: 
(d) Affidavit In support 
(e) j> Memorandum in support ( i n c l u d e d i n m o t i o n ) 
(fl Affidavit in opposition 
(g) Memorandum in opposition 
(h) Memorandum in reply 
(i) Other pleadlng(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
DATED: AUGUST (n&Y' 1993 . UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
I t ^ T f f 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
to: 
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY 
JAMES C. LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
505 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010 
on the ^ % £ d a y of AUGUST, 1993, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DUPLICATE FILED WITH THIRD DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
ON NOVEMBER 4, 1993. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and GEORGE 
S. DIUMENTI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J. RITTER, 
Defendants and Third 
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MERCURY AIRCOURIER SERVICE, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-86-3354 
This matter came on regularly for trial, commencing the 4th 
day of April, 1989, with William H. Lindsley, Esq. appearing on 
behalf of the plaintiff, and Brian M. Barnard, Esq. appearing on 
behalf of the defendants, and Duane R. Smith, Esq. appearing on 
behalf of the third party defendant* The matter was fully 
presented, argued and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon 
was taken under advisement. The Third Party Complaint in this 
matter was dismissed upon motion of the third party plaintiff. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings and the evidence in this 
matter, and having considered the submissions and arguments of 
ALLRED V. BROWN PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
counsel, now makes i t s ruling and dec i s ion on t h i s matter, as 
fol lows: 
The Court f inds the c r i t i c a l i s s u e to t h i s case to be 
whether there was in f a c t an agreement, oral in nature, as 
alleged and claimed by the p la int i f f that defendants as part of 
their agreement to rent or lease the a ircraf t in question from 
the p l a i n t i f f s also agreed to provide insurance coverage for any 
l o s s or damage o c c a s i o n e d by t h e i r use of the a i r c r a f t * 
Defendants allege that p l a i n t i f f s agreed as part of the agreement 
of rental to provide and take care of insurance coverage for 
their use of the a i rcra f t . Defendants further a l lege in defense 
that the aircraft was being leased by Mercury Aircourier Service, 
a corporat ion , rather than the defendants individually. The 
Court finds that the greater weight of the evidence persuades the 
Court, as follows: 
1. The p a r t i e s l eas ing the a ircraf t were the individual 
defendants Brown and Rit ter , and not the corporat ion, Mercury 
Aircourier Service. 
2. The ora l agreement between the p a r t i e s was that 
defendants agreed e i ther to take steps to be added to p l a i n t i f f ' s 
insurance , or to obtain their own insurance pol icy, either of 
which would provide coverage for their use of the aircraft . 
3. Defendants breached the agreement to provide insurance 
as required. 
ALLRED V, BROWN PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
4. P l a i n t i f f s sustained damage and l o s s in the sum of 
$33/133.86 occasioned by damage to the a i r c r a f t whi le i t was 
being operated by the defendants, and in their contro l . 
5. P l a i n t i f f s are e n t i t l e d to and are hereby awarded 
Judgment in the amount of $33/133.86/ and for i n t e r e s t thereon 
from December 1, 1986 to the present* 
Counsel for p l a i n t i f f i s requested to prepare appropriate 
Findings of Fact / Conclusions of Law# and Judgment consistent 
with the foregoing. 
Dated t h i s 14th day of June/ 1989. 
id 
JAMES S. S&WAYA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ALLRED V. BROWN PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this /gi-flL day of June, 1989: 
William H. Lindsley 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 S. Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Brian M. Barnard 
Attorney for Defendants 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Duane R. Smith 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
William H. Lindsley #1966 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J* ALLRED, and : 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI II, 
Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Case No, C86-3354 
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR J. Judge James S. Sawaya 
RITTER, : 
Defendants and Third : 
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
jMERCURY AIRCOURIER SERVICE, a 
Utah Corporation, : 
Third Party Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on the 
4th day of April, 1989, before The Honorable James S. Sawaya, judge 
presiding, plaintiffs were present and represented by counsel, 
William H. Lindsley; defendants were present and represented by 
counsel, Brian M. Barnard; third party defendant was represented 
by counsel, Duane R. Smith. The matter was fully presented, argued 
and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon was taken under 
advisement. The Third Party Complaint was dismissed upon motion 
of the Third Party Plaintiff. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings and the evidence in the matter, and having considered the 
submissions and arguments of counsel, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Douglas J, Allred and George S. Diuraenti II were the 
owners of an aircraft, a Cessna 414, registration number N8132Q, 
serial number 4140032. 
2. That pursuant to agreement by and between the owners of 
the aircraft and Larry H. Brown and Arthur J. Ritter, the latter 
leased said aircraft in or about the month of April 1984. 
3. That the understanding by and between the parties was oral 
in nature and pursuant thereto it was understood that Brown and 
Ritter would use the aircraft only after they had taken steps to 
be added to plaintiff's insurance or after obtaining coverage 
pursuant to their own insurance, that they would assure that use 
of the aircraft was insured. 
4. That defendants failed to take steps necessary to obtain 
insurance coverage. 
5. That the aircraft was damaged and there was a loss incurred 
in the sum of 33,133.86, said damage and loss occurring while the 
aircraft was in the control and possession of Brown and Ritter, and 
while being operated by them. 
6. That as a result of the damage to the aircraft the 
plaintiffs incurred a loss of the sum of $33,133.86. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the failure of Brown and Ritter to assure that the 
a ircra f t was insured prior to their use of the plane constituted 
a breach of the contract with the p l a i n t i f f s . 
2 . That as a resul t of defendants* breach, p l a i n t i f f s were 
damaged in the sum of $3?,133.86. 
3 . That p l a i n t i f f s are e n t i t l e d to a judgment aga ins t Brown 
and R i t t e t , j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y , for the sum of $33,133.86 
t o g e t h e r with i n t e r e s t thereon from December 1 , 1986 . 
Dated t h i s day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES S. SAWAYA 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I mailed a copy of the foregoing t h i s 
\ M <3ay of T-sjX.VA i 1989 , t o : Brian M. Barnard, Attorney 
a t Law, 214 East 500 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 and Duane 
R. Smith, Attorney a t Law, 4885 South 900 E a s t , S u i t e 306, Salt 
Lake C i t y , Utah 84117. 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
William H. Lindsley #1966 
p. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
([Telephone: 292-0447 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED, and : 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI II, 
Plaintiff, 
: JUDGMENT 
vs. 
: Case No. C86-3354 
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR J. Judge James S. Sawaya 
RITTER, : 
Defendants and Third : 
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
[MERCURY AIRCOURIER SERVICE, a 
lUtah Corporation, : 
Third Party Defendant. : 
I The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on the 
4th day of April, 1989, before The Honorable James S. Sawaya, judge 
presiding, plaintiffs were present and represented by counsel, 
William H. Lindsley; defendants were present and represented by 
counsel, Brian M. Barnard; third party defendant was represented 
by counsel, Duane R. Smith. The matter was fully presented, argued 
and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon was taken under 
advisement. The Third Party Complaint was dismissed upon motion 
of the Third Party Plaintiff. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings and the evidence in the matter, and having considered the 
submissions and arguments of counsel, and having heretofore signed 
and filed herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
enters judgment as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are granted judgment against defendants, 
jointly and severally, in the sum of $33,133.86, plus interest 
thereon from December 1, 1986 through June 14, 1989, in the sum of 
$14,084,40, for a total judgment of $47,218.26. 
Dated this day of
 f 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES S. SAWAYA 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I mai led a copy of the forego ing t h i s 
vD day of N V)\v\ r 1989, t o : Brian M. Barnard, Attorney 
a t Law, 214 East 500 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 and Duane 
R. Smith, Attorney at Law, 4885 South 900 East , S u i t e 306, Sa l t 
Lake C i t y , Utah 84117. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
Attorneys for Defendants 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J. RITTER, 
Defendants. 
: C i v i l No. C-86-3354 
: MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT or FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
: (Hon. J. SAWAYA ) 
THE DEFENDANTS pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure move the Court to amend the judgment and 
memorandum decision dated June 14, 1989 addressing the 
plaintiffs1 contract theory and cause of action and granting 
a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and state as follows: 
1. Defendants have ordered (or will shortly order) a 
transcript of the trial testimony of the plaintiff, George 
S. Diumenti. 
2. Defendants recall the testimony of George Diumenti 
to be that any agreement to provide insurance coverage was 
an agreement only by the defendant Arthur Ritter and that 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
the co-defendant Larry Brown was not a party to any such 
agreement. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants request that a new trial be 
granted or in the alternative that the defendant Brown be 
exonerated from any contract claim by the plaintiffs. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 1989. 
Attorney/ f 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of JUNE, 1989, I 
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
pleading MOTION TO AMEND OR FOR NEW TRIAL to: 
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
RIAN W. BARNARD \fy Attorne  for Defendants 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB } 0215 
JOHN PACE USB # 5624 
Attorneys for Defendant Brown 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and 
GEORGE S. DIUMNETI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J. RITTER, 
Defendant. 
: Civil No. C-86-3354 
: ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
: (Hon. J. SAWAYA ) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court 
on the Motion of the Defendant Larry H. Brown for a New 
Trial, (dated June 20, 1989), the Court having reviewed the 
matter and having considered the arguments of the parties, 
the Court having made a minute entry of August 28, 1989 
indicating the Courtfs ruling, based thereon and for good 
cause appearing, 
(DEFENDANT'S 1 EXHIBIT I 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
motion of the defendant Larry H. Brown for a new trial 
should be and hereby is denied. 
DATED this l"7 - day of JULY, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
I i 
JAMES SAWAYA 
JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of JULY, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing pleading ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEW TRIAL to: 
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
William H. Lindsley 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292*0447 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS J . ALLRED and GEORGE S. : 
DIUMENTI, 
P l a i n t i f f , COMPLAINT 
vs. 
: Case No. C - 8 6 - 3 3 5 4 
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR J , RITTER, 
Deferriants. ' ( H o n - J a m e s S a w a 7 a ) 
Plaint iffs complain of defendants and al lege as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. P l a i n t i f f s a r e i n d i v i d u a l s , r e s i d e n t s of Davis County, State of 
Utah. 
2. P l a i n t i f f s were and a re the owners of a 1970 Cessna Model 414 
a i r c r a f t , N 8132 Q. 
3 . In or a b o u t t h e l a t t e r p a r t of A p r i l 1984, p l a i n t i f f s and 
defendants entered i n t o an agreement whereby p l a i n t i f f s were t o a l low 
defendants the use and possess ion of the Cessna 414 a i rcraf t averred to in 
paragraph 2 hereof, 
4. In consideration thereof, defendants were to insure and maintain 
insurance on the a i r c r a f t in favor of p l a i n t i f f s , which insurance was to 
include l i a b i l i t y and damage in the amounts and deduct ib les then enjoyed by 
p l a i n t i f f s through t h e i r insurance with The Insurance Company of America, 
Valene Agency Incorporated, agent, of which p o l i c y , company and agency the 
defendants were afforded not ice . In addit ion thereto, defendants were to 
hangar the aircraft at their expense, pay for a l l fuel and oil attendant their 
use of the aircraft and pay to p l a i n t i f f s the sum of $100.00 per hour for 
every hour of their use . 
5 . Attendant s a i d agreement, defendants took possession of the 
aircraft on the 30th day of April, 1984. 
6• On the 9th day of May, 1984, at approximately 8:55 a.m. defendants, 
while operating the a i r c r a f t at the Tooele Val ley Airport, damaged the 
aircraft* 
7 . Defendants had f a i l e d to obta in insurance of any nature or 
endorsements covering the i r operation of t h e a i r c r a f t , which f a i l u r e 
const i tuted a breach of their agreement with plaintiffs and as a result of 
said breach, plaintiffs have been damaged in the sua of $30,000.00 attendant 
the repair of the a i r c r a f t and further sums to be proved at trial resulting 
from the loss of use of the aircraft. 
WHEREFORE, p la in t i f f s pray for judgment in the sum of $30,000.00 plus 
interest thereon and such further sums as proved at tr ia l . 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 5 of the First Cause of 
Action as if fully set forth herein. 
9. On the 9th day of May, 1984, a t the Tooele Valley Airport, in 
Tooele, Utah, at approximately 8:55 a.m. the defendants operated the a ircraf t 
in a negligent fashion in disregard for acknowledged and standard practices of 
operation, as a result of which negligence the defendants damaged the airplane 
in the sum of $30,000.00 and further sums to be proved at trial resulting from 
the loss of use of the aircraft* 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants in the sum 
of $30/000.00 plus interest thereon and such further sums as proved at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
10. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1# 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9 above as if 
fully set forth herein. 
11. That the defendant were bailees of the aircraft, the defendant the 
bailors. The defendants are obligated to the plaintiffs in the sum of 
$30f000.00 as a result of the bailment and subsequent events. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants in the sum 
of $30,000.00 plus interest thereon. 
Dated this "^7 day of May, 1986. 
William H. Lindsley y 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
